



**Sticking Around:
Delayed Departure from the Parental
Nest in Western Europe**

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Sticking Around: Delayed Departure from the Parental Nest in Western Europe

Most chapters in this volume focus on the transition to adulthood in the United States, yet some of the most dramatic changes in pathways to independence are unfolding beyond our borders. In some Catholic countries of Western Europe, young adults are marrying later or not marrying at all. Below-replacement fertility has produced pressures to open the gates to immigration in countries with little or no history of incorporating newcomers. Changing patterns of household formation have wide ranging implications for inter-generational economic transfers and are taking place against the backdrop of divergent national policies for old-age support, labor market protection, national investment in higher education, and child care benefits.

This chapter examines delayed departure from the natal home in Western Europe where, in some countries, over 50 percent of men age 30 still reside with their parents, having never left home. In others, the age of independence is considerably younger than it is in the U.S. We focus on the role of employment, housing barriers, and social policy in shaping patterns of home leaving and then consider whether a pronounced shift in the direction of delayed departure has affected the life satisfaction of young adults in Europe.

Sociologists who have studied this issue in the US have noted that an abrupt change in the timing of independence creates tension as new generations of adolescents violate the norms and expectations of those who came before them (Newman 1993). The resulting confusion over when, in normative terms, it is appropriate to make major life transitions can lead to widespread concern about “defective” generations that do not abide by social conventions. But this is not the only conceivable outcome. In some countries, for example Italy, general well-being and satisfaction seem to be enhanced by long stays in the family home and in places where youth face high levels of economic uncertainty, the family can be a critical (and welcome) buffer in the face of instability.

We hypothesize that as the stay-at-home pattern shifts from being a feature of a small group, to one that is recognizable as a defined pathway, the social anxiety that accompanies delayed departure diminishes. It is the non-normative nature of new patterns that is disruptive or transgressive. Once a new norm is evident, it becomes more socially acceptable and possibly even a source of pleasure, rather than a source of internal unhappiness or inter-generational tension, for adults to remain with their parents. Indeed, the comfort factor may make it difficult for social policies (such as family allowances, pension benefits based on marital status, etc.) to stimulate either marriage or childbearing, a problem for countries in which declining fertility poses a major challenge.

We pursue our analysis in three steps. First, we draw upon the European Quality of Life Survey of 2003 (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2003) to show the diversity of patterns in home leaving across Western Europe. Second, we utilize OECD data to explore the impact of youth unemployment, housing barriers, and specific domains of social policy on the proportion of young people age 18-34 who reside with their parents. Finally, using the EQLS survey, we examine how delayed departure is associated with life satisfaction of young adults. We test the hypothesis that the “normative status” of independence versus delayed departure influences the depth of dissatisfaction with an individual’s residential situation and his/her social role as an “aging dependent.”

Sticking Around

The age at which young people leave the parental home has been rising in all developed nations. Yet southern Europe stands out as a region that has seen a pronounced delay in home-leaving develop over a short period of time (Cherlin, Scabini, and Rossi 1997; Alders and

Manting 1999; Cordon 1997). At present, the median age of departure from the parental home ranges from 20 for Finnish women to 30 for Italian men.¹

Recent data from the European Quality of Life Survey (fig. 1) show that only around 10 percent of those aged 18 to 34 reside with their parents in Scandinavian countries. Northern European countries have rates between about 15 and 30 percent. In Southern Europe as many as 60 percent of young adults living with their parents.²

Southern Europe further differs from other countries in that two life stages predominate among the young: the transition is made directly from being single, childless, and living with parents to living with a spouse and soon thereafter, with children.³ As table 1 makes clear, diverse and extended intermediate stages such as living alone or cohabitation flourish elsewhere. (Iacovou 2002; Billari 2004; Billari, Philipov, and Baizan 2001; Rossi 1997; Mulder and Manting 1994; Cook and Furstenberg 2002).

Market conditions, social policy, and variation in home leaving

European countries vary on many social policy and labor market dimensions that provide possible explanations for the variation in the proportion of young adults living with their parents. For example, housing market conditions can facilitate or delay home-leaving. Housing costs have been rising as a proportion of all consumer expenditures throughout Europe (Boelhouwer and Heijden 1993). Public policies have created divergent patterns of housing availability.⁴ In the Netherlands, 42 percent of the total housing stock is in the public sector, (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2004) with housing built specifically for young students and workers (Mulder and Hooimeijer 2002). Austria and the UK also have a great deal of municipal housing – 26 percent each (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2004). Denmark saw a construction boom in the 1980s, much of it in the public rental sector (Boelhouwer and Heijden 1993). 73 percent of rented dwellings in the UK are public, compared to 37 percent in France and 8 percent in Spain. (Holdsworth and Solda 2002; Jurado Guerrero 2001)

Unique situations have shaped some European housing markets. West Germany faced an acute housing problem following reunification as many Eastern Germans migrated to areas with more jobs and a higher standard of living. The government responded by encouraging deregulation of rents (Boelhouwer and Heijden 1993) which created affordability problems for youth. Spain experienced a construction boom after entering the EU, but one that has aggravated the situation of most Spaniards through price hikes while increasing the housing stock of high end dwellings, second residences, and tourist accommodations.

The economic crisis that swept much of Europe in the 1980s prompted many governments to deregulate, abolish rent control, sell public housing and encourage home ownership. This altered the housing landscape in Spain (Holdsworth 2000; Holdsworth and Solda 2002), France, Belgium, and the UK (Boelhouwer and Heijden 1993). Italy instituted a

¹ Young people in the Nordic countries are most likely to live away from their parents, while young Southern Europeans are the least likely (Iacovou 2002). The proportion of 25-29 year olds living with parents in Southern Europe is higher than the proportion of 20-24 year olds living with parents in Central Europe and this gap has been widening (Cordon 1997).

² Measures of variability in ages at home-leaving show diversity within countries as well. Scandinavian countries are more homogeneous than southern European countries. (Billari, Philipov, and Baizan 2001; Billari 2004)

³ Southern Europeans are also less likely than their northern counterparts to return home once they have left. (Holdsworth and Solda 2002)

⁴The underground economy complicates the picture significantly in southern Europe, where as much as 50% of housing in Italy, for instance, is illegal (Castles and Ferrera 1996)

'just rent' scheme which resulted in a bifurcated rental market, with affordable but oversubscribed rentals on one hand and accessible but unaffordable housing on the other (Castles and Ferrera 1996). In 1991, Sweden raised caps on rent by 20 percent but continued to provide generous tax relief on mortgage interest (Boelhouwer and Heijden 1993).

In countries where homeownership is dominant, young adults are less able to leave the parental home unless the government provides assistance for first-time buyers (relatively rare). In Spain and Italy, over 70 percent of people own their dwellings (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2004) and there is no public provision for new entrants to the private housing market.⁵ 54 percent of primary residences are owner-occupied in France and 65 percent in the UK (Holdsworth and Solda 2002; Jurado Guerrero 2001). Most Spaniards buy a house *before* leaving the parental home (Holdsworth 2000), with only a quarter moving out to a rented dwelling compared to three quarters of the French (Jurado Guerrero 2001).

Utilizing OECD data on the shares of owner-occupied housing across the EU-15 (OECD 2004/1), we find a clear relationship between the proportion of the market that is privately owned and the proportion of young adults living with their parents (Figure 2). A 10 percent increase in owner-occupied housing is associated with about 4 percent increase in the proportion living with parents. About 12 percent of the variance among countries in the prevalence of co-residence with parents is explained by the proportion of owner-occupied housing.

Changes in the labor market prospects of young Europeans – particularly increases in unemployment or temporary employment - have also contributed to the tendency to prolong the stay in the family home. Two seemingly opposite aspects of labor regulation can lead to this outcome. One occurs when a previously protectionist policy shifts, but in such a way that the new policy mainly affects new entrants to the labor market, who tend to be young. Complaints surrounding the rigidity of European labor markets, particularly the difficulty of laying workers off, led some countries to adopt legislation permitting temporary contracts. Starting in 1984, for instance, Spanish firms were allowed to arrange short-term contracts with any employee, a sharp departure from past practices. Today a third of Spanish workers are governed by short-term agreements, the highest level in Western Europe. However, older workers, who had permanent jobs before the reforms, had more bargaining power to protect their insider status. New entrants to the labor market were more likely to find themselves with temporary contracts. The percentage of 25 to 29 year old Spanish male workers in temporary employment rose from 20 percent in 1987 to over 50 percent less than ten years later (Golsch 2003). Figure 3 shows that as temporary employment rises, the proportion of 18-34 year olds living with their parents grows as well.

The alternative pathway to youth labor market problems involves continuing rigidity in labor market policy, which also disproportionately impacts youth. The OECD summary indicator of overall employment protection legislation classifies countries on the protection of regular workers against individual dismissal, regulation of temporary forms of employment, as well as requirements for collective dismissals. (OECD 2004) Figure 4 shows that as employment protection grows stronger, youth unemployment rises. Employers hesitate to offer positions to young and inexperienced workers if they cannot terminate them. France is a case in point. The French government attempted to address this issue in March of 2006 by proposing new regulations that would permit employers to fire workers under the age of 26 with no notice or severance as a means of addressing present barriers to youth employment. 23 percent of French citizens under the age of 26 are jobless and in the immigrant districts outside major cities, the figures rise to nearly 50 percent. The proposal sparked enormous street demonstrations and

⁵ Southern European countries have historically had high savings rates and few other ways to invest, coupled with a cultural propensity to invest in housing. Nevertheless, these differences need to be kept in perspective because until the 1970s, homeownership levels in Italy and Spain were at the OECD average. (Castles and Ferrera 1996)

caused the shut down of more than half of France's public universities.⁶ It was withdrawn a month later, just in time to avert what many analysts predicted would be the collapse of the Chirac government.

There is also a strong relationship between employment protection and the incident of temporary contracts among young workers. Figure 5 shows that an increase in one point on the employment protection scale is associated with about a 8% increase in the proportion of 25 to 39 year old workers with temporary contracts. 46 percent of the variance in temporary employment in this age group is explained by employment protection.

These two trends - youth unemployment⁷ and temporary employment - increase the likelihood that young people will remain with their parents, whose resources (housing, income, etc.) buffer their earnings instability (Eurostat 2002). Moving up a point in the employment protection scale (0-6) is correlated with an additional 7 percent of young people living with their parents. (see figure 6) This relationship is stronger than the one between the proportion of owner-occupied housing and living arrangements, with 17 percent of the variance in proportion living with parents explained by the employment protection scale.

While proportions of unemployed have stayed more or less stable, the rates of "idleness"⁸ among young people have been increasingly everywhere in Europe, but much more dramatically in the south (Cordon 1997). Employment to population ratio allows us to get at idleness and school enrollment as well as unemployment rates. (OECD 2003, figure 7) The negative relationship shown here is as expected - as more young people are in the labor force, the proportion living with their parents decreases. A 10 percent increase in the employment ratio is associated with a 9 percent decrease in the proportion living with parents. The relationship is rather weak, although stronger than that for unemployment and living arrangements.

One potential explanation for the relatively weak relationship between unemployment and delayed departure from the family home lies in variations in the sources of income that youth receive. A combination of joblessness and lack of unemployment insurance produces pressures for youth to rely on family resources (or refrain from venturing far from them in the first place) unless alternative resources are available by dint of social policy.⁹ Figure 8 looks at the sources of support for the young unemployed across countries, as reported by respondents of the Eurobarometer Survey in 2001. In southern Europe, parents/family resources are virtually all that is available to support jobless youth. In the Nordic Countries and some liberal democracies, such as Ireland and the UK, unemployment/social security provides the lion's share of support to unemployed youth. Continental regimes, like France, Germany, and Belgium, fall in the middle.

In countries where substantial benefits are available to young people who are out of work or who have never worked, the capacity to become (or remain) independent of parental resources is greater than in countries where these benefits are closed to young people. As expected, the average percent of 18-34 year olds living at home rises when benefits are available

⁶ Elaine Sciolina, "French Students Step Up Protests Against New Job Law" New York Times, Wednesday, March 15, 2006. p. A3.

⁷ Unemployment rates are quite varied within the European Union. Southern European countries have the highest unemployment rates across age groups, ranging from 15 percent in Greece to 28 percent in Spain, as compared to 5 percent in Austria and 7 percent in the Netherlands (Lippman 2002). However, the impact of unemployment has been concentrated disproportionately among young workers, particularly in the south. More the 70 percent of unemployed in Italy are under 29 (Cook and Furstenberg 2002).

⁸ Defined as economically inactive, meaning not working and not in school.

⁹ Policies governing employment protection also influence the options for youth. Social democratic and conservative welfare regimes have stronger employment protection legislation than liberal regimes, which creates difficulties for young people because employers are unwilling to hire them, especially during economic downswings. (Breen and Buchmann 2002) This is the case in Italy, where the government protects high paying jobs of older workers and sponsors their subsequent retirement based on their incomes before retirement. (Cook and Furstenberg 2002)

(OECD 2004, figure 9). Where benefits are available, on average 14 percent fewer young people live with parents. Benefit availability explains 28 percent of the variance in percent living with parents.¹⁰

The Impact of Delayed Departure on Life Satisfaction

Does delayed departure make young people feel out of step with others in their society? We hypothesize that for the current generation of young adults in Europe, delayed departure has taken a toll on their sense of life satisfaction. This is partly because the pattern of independence differs from that of adjacent generations, particularly their own parents, who may be unaware of (or choose to ignore) the structural factors that make leaving home now more difficult (see Newman, 1993, for an American parallel).

Yet, as this pattern grows more common, we might expect to see adjustments inside households to accommodate this new model of maturation that may lead to acceptance and even more positive relations between generations who live together. Of course, cultural and political influences can “retard” this adjustment by publicly defining delayed departure as a default on the social contract. In the latter case, the growing proportion of young adults at home may lead to positive relations inside the household, but a continued discomfort in the public sphere and a dissonant experience of norm violation.

The European Quality of Life Survey of 2003 (EQLS) is a cross-sectional survey of 26,257 Europeans over the age of 18 in 28 European countries and Turkey. For this paper, we examine data for the 15 member states of the European Union before 2004. There were about 1,000 respondents for each country, with the exception of Luxembourg, which had 600. Restricting our analysis to people aged 18 to 34 yields a sample size of 4,096.

While this dataset collects extensive information about a range of quality of life measures response rates varied greatly across the countries, ranging from 30 percent in Spain to 91 percent in Germany. Although this is troublesome, a comparison of household income distribution within the sample and OECD indicators¹¹ concluded that the EQLS data does not deviate enough from national indicators to merit adjustments. This was true for median incomes (the correlation between country median of EQLS household income with GDP per capita is 0.92) as well as for income dispersion.¹²

We examine the effect of co-residence with parents and other predictors on life satisfaction, using a random effects hierarchical ordered logit model. The hierarchical model allows us to decompose the variance into individual and macro levels. Table 2 describes the variables used in this analysis. The effect of living with one’s parents and of the percentage of young people who live at home is examined, net of age, sex, marital status, parental status, employment and its precariousness, student status, income, economic hardship, number in household, home ownership, and number of rooms.¹³ The interaction term, between living at

¹⁰ Without Italy, it actually explains less (23%).

¹¹ Conducted by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2005)

¹² Two deviations that are noted concern Denmark and Germany. The EQLS data for Denmark shows wider income dispersion than data from other sources. (not sure how this would affect our results) Data for Germany has a median income in the bottom income quartile that is lower than outside estimates. If there is an overrepresentation of those on the bottom of the lowest quartile, it has a potential to skew our results by including a disproportionate number of young people who are in extremely difficult financial situations. Nevertheless, the authors of the report did not deem these two deviations as severe enough to require correction.

¹³ Unfortunately, we are unable to include an indicator of educational attainment in our analysis since that variable had serious problems and EQLS recommends using number of years of education instead. In addition to variation in meaning that the latter indicator has across different countries, the fact that many

home and percent of young people at home in the country is included to test the hypothesis that the effect of living at home is mediated by how widespread this status is in the given country.

From the simple means, young people living with parents appear to score about the same on life satisfaction. However, there is significant national variation in life satisfaction, which warrants multi-level modeling. (see table 3) And as we saw earlier, the rates of living with parents vary greatly by country, with very high levels of co-residence in Southern Europe and very low levels in Scandinavia. (fig.1)

The bivariate correlations between percent living at home and life satisfaction across the 15 EU countries is $r=.053$, which is statistically significant but weak. For a more powerful analysis, we present the two-level ordered logit model with an interaction effect between living with parents and percentage living with parents in the country.¹⁴ The effect of living at home becomes much more striking.

The results of the analysis are presented in table 4. The model predicting life satisfaction supports our hypothesis that the aggregate level of co-residence with parents (how widespread it is) moderates the effect of living with one's parents at the individual level. On average, living with parents decreases life satisfaction substantially. Holding other factors constant, living with parents is associated with 45% lower odds of scoring higher on the life satisfaction scale. Moreover, living in countries where more young people are at home is associated with lower life satisfaction. More specifically, a 10% increase in the proportion living with parents is associated with a 22% reduction in the odds of scoring higher on life satisfaction. However, the interaction term between living at home and percent of young adults living at home has an odds ratio greater than one. This implies that the negative effect of living at home on life satisfaction is reduced, the more normative the status becomes. The magnitude of the interaction effect is similar to that on the aggregate co-residence measure, but with the opposite sign, which indicates that for young adults living with their parents, the 'normalcy' of this arrangement in the country almost exactly counterbalances the negative effect of living in a country with higher prevalence of co-residence.

All three coefficients are significant, hence we reject the hypothesis that there is no difference in odds of higher life satisfaction between those who are living with parents and those who are not; between those who live in countries where it is more common to live with parents and those who do not; and that the 'normalcy' of living with parents does not moderate the individual effect of living with parents.

The same model also shows that being married, employed, or a student each had a large positive effect on life satisfaction. Young adults living in a home that was owner-occupied or had more rooms were also significantly more likely to be satisfied with their lives. Predictably, economic hardship was associated with much reduced odds of scoring higher on the life satisfaction. Income seems to have a non-linear effect, since only those in the highest quartile had a significant and positive association with life satisfaction. Few young adults are earning enough to place them into the top quartile of the overall income distribution for the working population. Those who are, however, have 27% higher odds of being more satisfied with the lives. Having own children, gender and the number of people in the household do not have a significant effect on life satisfaction once other factors are taken into account.

In all, we can say that the subjective 'disadvantage' of living with parents decreases as the proportion of people living at home increases. The normalcy of co-residence *positively* mediates the effect of living with parents in young adulthood in the case of life satisfaction.

young respondents are still in school pose a significant problem and we chose not to use that variable either.

¹⁴ One might imagine that men and women would react differently to the constraint of living with parents, since traditionally women were kept under closer watch and more restricted by their parents. However, gender is statistically insignificant in this analysis.

Conclusion

The rate at which young people are able to become residentially independent clearly varies across Europe. The evidence presented here suggests that employment and unemployment benefit policies that protect older workers at the expense of new entrants to the labor market make it harder for young adults to move out of their family homes. Housing markets play a key role in the pattern of home leaving as well. In countries with a large rental sector, the proportion of young adults living at home is relatively small, while in countries with a high rate of home ownership, the barriers to residential independence are high, particularly if there are no first-time home buyer programs and labor market conditions make the acquisition of long-term employment problematic (and therefore reduce the ability of young people to acquire financing).

When we consider the relatively steep down payments expected of European buyers (generally closer to 50% of the value of the home, as compared to 10-20% in the American context), it seems clear that young people will be at a disadvantage in joining the ranks of home owners. In short, market conditions and social policies seem to have a significant impact on the age at which young Europeans separate from their natal homes.

Is this constraint on residential independence socially consequential? To what extent does delayed departure impact the more subjective domain of life satisfaction? We find support for our hypothesis that the more prevalent the practice of delayed departure, the less troublesome it becomes. As the pattern of living with parents into the late 20's and 30's spreads, the negative effects of co-residence on life satisfaction diminish. This suggests that social anxiety declines as the new residential arrangement affects many and becomes a defined pathway. Living with parents is no longer seen *necessarily* as a sign of personal failure or a harbinger of difficult family dynamics.

The development of new demographic patterns rarely proceeds smoothly, particularly when they have such significant consequences for bedrock questions of national fertility rates, labor supply, and the viability of social security systems. Even if these structural problems were not at issue, sharp divergence between adjacent generations in the pathway to adulthood can arouse controversy. To the extent that residential and financial autonomy remains important landmarks on the way to personal independence and full-fledged adulthood.

Yet there is no reason *a priori*, why these facets must remain as tightly interlocked as they have been in the past. Indeed, it may be that we are witnessing the development of a new developmental stage, one we might term "in house adulthood." Living with one's parents at age 15 is likely to imply a very different set of constraints on privacy, freedom of action, sexual expression, and subordination to parental control than may be in place at age 30. Young people who crest into their thirties while still at home may find that they develop relationships that are structured less in terms of authoritative parent and submissive child, and more like co-equals who reside together and enjoy one another's company and support, while backing off the constraints that once restricted youth – particularly girls – to parentally approved behavior enforced through surveillance.

The growth of two-income households and the attendant time pressures on parents may mean that they have less time for their children's early years and hence less of an "itch" to see them depart at what was once the normative age. They may come to feel that they have not had their fill of their children at age 18 and are not as ready to let them go as previous generations might have been. Parents are delaying childbearing, having fewer kids, investing more of their resources (including time and money) in those they have. Changes in the transition to adulthood are part and parcel of much broader changes in family arrangements which are affecting today's parents as well. Hence the change we investigate here – in the transition to adulthood – may be more fruitfully investigated as an elongation of the entire family system, which has consequences for the social roles of all generations. Teresa Jurado Guerrero (2001) reports on a different Eurobarometer survey for 1993 that found that more than half of all Europeans think it's a good

thing that adult children live longer with parents, although the variation is considerable: only a third of Spaniards agreed, while 70 percent of Greeks did so. Giovanna Rossi (1997) argues that a participatory model of family is predominant in Italy, characterized by egalitarian communication between parents and children. Parents and adult children living with them are satisfied with the arrangement, and continue to be satisfied as children get older. (Scabini and Cigoli 1997) In fact, both parents and children feel that the main disadvantage of leaving home is emotional loss. 60 percent of parents do not see any advantages in a child's departure (Dalla Zuanna 2001).

Moreover, children are pleased with their levels of autonomy within the family. (Scabini and Cigoli 1997) They have egalitarian relationships with their parents characterized by reciprocal emotional dependence. (Cook and Furstenberg 2002)¹⁵ Under these circumstances, leaving the parental home is not seen as an important marker of adulthood the way steady employment is. It is clearly possible to be a responsible adult while living under the parental roof.

It remains to be seen whether other countries will develop a similar form of "in house adulthood," but the data we have analyzed here gives us reason to think this may come to pass. The more delayed departure becomes normative, the less the stigma associated with the practice.

¹⁵ Adult children in southern Europe may be satisfied with their levels of self-determination, but Saraceno (2004) points out that individual decisions impacting the transition to adulthood are really intergenerational and kin decisions, whether this is admitted or even fully realized.

As Margaret Mead showed us many decades ago, there are many ways to organize family life, each with its own logic. And while tension may go with this territory, it is a malleable sentiment, whose flip-side – affection and intimacy – may come to be valued just as much as autonomy.

This may not be the news that social policy analysts want to hear since there are clearly significant consequences to delayed departure that are problematic. When young people stay home into their thirties, they don't marry early enough to have many children. The "birth dearth" is causing serious perturbations in the social security system of countries like Italy, Spain and Japan. Particularly in conservative welfare regimes, which rely on families to care for their own before the state steps in, the capacity of young people to "graduate" to adulthood in time to husband the resources to take care of their own parents may be compromised. This may be responsible for the unprecedented interest shown by the elderly in Japan in retirement homes which barely existed in years' past (Campbell and Campbell 2003) It may be that their children are not in a position to take care of them in the ways that elders could have expected as a birthright in the past.


No doubt it will take time for social policy to catch up to demographic reality. Along the way, we will see some serious strains in welfare states around the globe. Yet absent a sharp change in the economic fortunes of young people or the development of a widespread change in sentiment that would underwrite Scandinavian-style supports for the residential autonomy of youth, it is hard to imagine the trend toward delayed departure abating.

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Figure 1.




Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2003

Table 1. Household arrangements of 18-34 year old men

	With parents	Alone	Coupled (with or without children)	Other
Denmark	17%	33%	48%	1%
Sweden	10%	44%	39%	7%
Finland	13%	39%	44%	4%
Belgium	27%	28%	40%	6%
Austria	26%	35%	27%	11%
France	28%	36%	31%	6%
Germany	19%	40%	31%	11%
Luxembourg	32%	12%	38%	18%
Netherlands	35%	27%	31%	6%
UK	19%	34%	30%	17%
Ireland	24%	10%	29%	36%
Italy	62%	11%	19%	8%
Greece	37%	33%	17%	14%
Spain	39%	5%	35%	21%
Portugal	46%	7%	36%	11%
EU15	33%	26%	29%	12%


Source: European Quality of Life Survey 2003

Figure 2. Proportion of 18-34 year olds living with parents by % owner-occupied housing




$r=0.34$ Source: *OECD Economic review No. 38, 2004/1*

Figure 3. Proportion of 18-34 year olds living with parents by proportion of young workers (25-39) in temporary employment.




$r=0.23$ Source: *Eurostat, Statistical Office of the European Communities, 2003*

Figure 4. Youth unemployment rate by employment protection scale (0-6)




$r=0.53$ Source: SourceOECD, *Employment and Labour Market Statistics, OECD Employment Outlook, 2004*

Figure 5. Proportion of young workers (25-39) in temporary employment by employment protection scale (0-6).



$r=0.68$ Source: Eurostat, *Statistical Office of the European Communities, 2003*


Figure 6. Proportion of 18-34 year olds living with parents
By employment protection scale (0-6)*



$r=0.41$ Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2004


*see appendix for definition

Figure 7. Proportion of 18-34 year olds living with parents by employment-to-population ratio.




$r=-0.36$ Source: SourceOECD, Employment and Labour Market Statistics

Figure 8.



Source: Eurobarometer: Young Europeans 2001, from question: Where do you get most of your money from? Choose all that apply: regular job, unemployment/social security benefits, training allowance/educational grant, family, casual work, partner, work in the 'black economy', and other.

Figure 9: Living arrangement by availability of unemployment benefits



Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2004

Table 2. European Quality of Life Survey 2003

Variable	Definition	Mean	
		Living with parents (n=1,194)	Living without parents (n=2,902)
Life Satisfaction	How satisfied you are with your life these days (1-10)	7.42	7.47
Age	Years	22.7	27.7
Male	Sex=male	0.51	0.39
Married	Married or living with a partner	0.06	0.56
Employed	Currently working for pay	0.45	0.67
Student	Enrolled in higher education	0.42	0.12
Lives with parents	Mother and/or father in the same household	--	--
Home is owned	Own without mortgage or own with mortgage	0.64	0.40
Rooms	Number of rooms in the dwelling, excluding kitchen, bathroom, hallways	4.62	3.37
Number of people in the household	Including the respondent	3.76	2.33
Income quartile – 2 nd (household)	Quartiles of OECD equivalent household income per country (1 st quartile as reference category)	0.12	0.17
Income quartile – 3 rd (household)		0.16	0.21
Income quartile – 4 th (household)		0.12	0.20
Hardship	Household in arrears when paying bills in the last 12 months	0.03	0.07
Percent at home	Percent of 18-34 year olds living with parents in given country	34.5	26.9
Living with parents x percent at home	Interaction term between living with parents and percent of 18-34 year olds living with parents	34.5	--

Table 3: Mean differences in life satisfaction by country and residential status

	Life Satisfaction	
	without parents	with parents
Austria	7.78	7.48
Belgium	7.41	7.18
Denmark	8.31	8.28
Finland	8.09	8.11
France	6.79	6.78
Germany	7.31	7.98
Greece	7.50	6.96
Ireland	7.61	7.96
Italy	7.33	7.43
Luxembourg	7.61	7.24
Netherlands	7.43	7.42
Portugal	6.20	7.06
Spain	7.67	7.71
Sweden	7.77	7.66
UK	7.14	7.27

Source: *European Quality of Life Survey 2003*

Table 4: Two-Level Ordered Logit Model with Random Effects

	Life Satisfaction
	Odds Ratio
Age	0.972***
Male	0.919
Married	1.564***
Own child(ren)	1.140
Employed (ref: not working)	1.677***
Student (ref: not working)	2.075***
Lives with parents	0.546***
Home is owned	1.450***
Number of rooms	1.052**
Number of people in hh	0.983
Income quartile – 2 nd	0.954
Income quartile – 3 rd	1.116
Income quartile – 4 th	1.270**
Hardship	0.197***
Percentage living at home	0.978***
Lives with parents x percent at home	1.017***
Constant	0.204
Level-2 country effect (not exponentiated) (St. Dev.)	.140(.023)
Log Likelihood	-7340

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$

Source: EQLS 2003

Appendix. Country-level indicators of housing and labor market

Variable	Definition	Source
Percent in owner occupied housing	Share of owner-occupied housing, 2002	OECD Economic review No. 38, 2004/1
Availability of unemployment benefits (dichotomous)	Benefits available in 2002 for a 20-year-old unemployed single person, living alone with no family responsibilities and no employment record	Benefits and Wages: OECD Indicators, 2004
Unemployment rate in %	Unemployment rate for 20-34 year olds in 2003	SourceOECD, Employment and Labour Market Statistics
Employment/Population Ratio	Ratio of employed 20-34 year olds to total population of 20-34 year olds in 2003	SourceOECD, Employment and Labour Market Statistics
Employment Protection Scale	Overall strictness of employment protection legislation, an 18 item scale that includes indicators of <i>i</i>) employment protection of regular workers against individual dismissal; <i>ii</i>) specific requirements for collective dismissals; and <i>iii</i>) regulation of temporary forms of employment	OECD Employment Outlook, 2004
Percent in temporary employment	Temporary employees as percent of the total employees for 25-39 year olds	Eurostat European Social Statistics: Labour force survey results 2003